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Chaucer and the Sbape of Creation: The Aestbetic Possibilities of Inorganic
Structure by Robert M. Jordan. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univer~
sity Press, 1967. Pp. xii, 257. $6,95.
Here is an appealingly brief, handsomely produced, book, with an enticing
dust jacket and a bold title. Perhaps, as a result, I expected too much, or perhaps
it is that I disagree frequently with what Professor Jordan has to say-at any
rate I was left disenchanted. Certainly it is not the fault of the writing, for the
author writes engagingly, and certainly he has something to say, although some
of it has already been said by him in articles. If I concentrate in this review
on those points where I disagree with Professor Jordan, it is by way of indicating
that I take him seriously, and that I do not intend an essay on disench:monent,
but an essay about basic issues.
In a brief introduction Professor Jordan tells us that D. W. Robertson, Jr.
is right in noting that medieval is not modern, but "must demur ... from his
extravagant estimate of the importance of Christian exegetical tradition in the.
poetry of Chaucer." (2) For Jordan the heart of the matter lies to the contrary
in medieval inorganic structure, that is, the II inorganic discontinuity between
fiction and experience. . . . the conscious awareness that the "literature,' the
visible data, being untrue, is distinctly separated from the truth, as the letter
of Scriptures was known to be separated from the spirit." (6-7) With this
statement, as phrased, it is difficult to quarrel, but the statement apparently
means something different to Professor Jordan than it does to me, for he goes
on to say that in "the' Retractions' following the Canterbury Tales and the
'Epilogue' of Troilus and Criseyde .•• the poet anxiously questions the bases
of his art and condemns all that is not conducive to piety and spiritual enlightenment." (7-8) To argue that the distinction between the letter and the spirit
of Scriptures is echoed in Chaucer by a split between his "art" and his
" doctrine" is to argue by an analogy which actually proves, if it proves anything,
the opposite; that is, that Chaucer sees his" art" at the service of his "doctrine."
The spirit (doctrine, meaning) of Scriptures is not separate from the letter;
rather it follows from it. Chaucer's "mistrust of fiction" is simply the mistrust
of the letter which kills because it is not informed by the spirit, but as Professor
Robertson and I have both argued Chaucer's" letter" is directed by the" spirit."
To hold that the" Epilogue" to the Troilus is a "denial" of its art is either to
trivialize the poem, or to suggest an essential hypocrisy in Chaucer, a charge
which Professor Jordan seems to accept, however gently, when he says of the
U Retractions" and the "Epilogue IJ that they, II however fervent, are after all
only statements." (8)
In Chapter Two Professor Jordan sets seriously to work on his task of
emancipating Chaucer's "art" from its enslavement to the Augustinian tradition.
He begins again with Professor Robertson, who, like Chaucer's doctrine, is not
to be gotten rid of. Agreeing that in A Preface to Chaucer RobertSOn has made
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"an impressive beginning" toward defining the elements of medieval aesthetic
theory as they relate to Chaucer's an, Jordan finds, however, that the book" as
a study of aesthetic norms is weakened by an ambiguous definition of the scope
of the subject." (10) Apparently this ambiguity results from Robertson's dwelling
"much more extensively upon spiritual and moral than upon aesthetic considerations." (10-11) Professor Jordan proposes to rectify this imbalance by stressing
the (( Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition of aesthetic theory," in particular, "the
significance of the Timaeus for medieval aesthetic." (11-12)
Too brief to establish a successful counterweight to Robertson, his remarks in
this chapter suffer from a failure to take proper cognizance of the scope of the
theory he is trying to rectify. Concentrating exclusively on the Preface, he
ignores all else which introduces and complements that admirable book; i. e.,
Piers Plowman and Scriptural Tradition, and Fruyt and Chaf by Robertson and
Huppe; Doctrine and Poetry, and A Reading of the Canterbury Tales by Huppe.
There is nothing ambiguous about the principles of medieval literary theory
propounded and applied in these worl{s. Professor Robertson and I are properly
aware of the importance of the Timaeus, and of pagan literary theory, in the
formulation of Augustinian literary theory, to which, we believe, Chaucer
adhered. At the heart of this theory is the principle that the letter and sense
(poetic and narrative structure) are at the service of the sentence (a meaning
consonant with doctrinal truth.) Perhaps we are wrong, but it does no good to
say we are ambiguous by ignoring what we have said. There is simply no way,
if we are right, albeit extravagant, to disengage "pagan" from "Christian,"
"aesthetic" from" moral" considerations. Professor Jordan has done excellent
service in designating Chaucer's art as "inorganic," but in separating this art
from its source in Augustinian literary theory Professor Jordan creates more
ambiguities than he cures.
Thus his simplistic view of allegory leads him to wonder at "_ Curtius' inclusion
of Chaucer among the company of Prudentius, the Romance of the Rose, and
Spenser in the allegorical tradition." His wonder is caused by his seeing allegory
simply as "personified abstraction," a definition which leads him to a curious
bit of special pleading; "Sophisticated efforts to read Chaucer as though he were
practicing allegorical expression, as though his characters were as simplified as,
say, Guillaume's Deduit, and as though he were as industriously devoted as
Augustine to 'using' all temporal things as means to eternal Truth have proved
to be unconvincing." (33) Here is black and white. Allegory is personification,
as with Guillaume's Deduit; Chaucer is complex; therefore, Chaucer is not an
allegorist! Obviously, stated as Jordan states it, the attempt to relate Chaucer
to the central allegorical tradition is bound to be unconvincing, but in actuality,
Chaucer as I understand him, does ascribe to the Augustinian doctrine of "use,"
which gives to art the function of revealing eternal truth. In his own" Epilogue"
Professor Jordan seems to agree; II The fiction of the Canterbury Tales [does not]
lose any of its literary persuasiveness for standing in its place within the edifice
of Truth." (24 I)
Professor Jordan's simplistic view is also suggested in his remarks on Dante's
Vita Nuova. Jordan sees only the formal statements of division as exegesis, and
fails to grasp that all the prose sections arc commentary on the: allegorical book
of Dante's life, as Dante himself makes clear.
In Chapter Three, Jordan summarizes the works of Panofsky and von Simson
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on the Gothic cathedral by way of setting up an analogy to the "inorganic"
structure of Chaucer's two major poems. The analogy is interesting although
Jordan uses it in curious ways in the remaining chapters. For the Troilus, the
analogy seems to work something like this. We watch all the motifs of recurrent
design-Jordan is most perceptive here; we enjoy this display, and then in the
" Epilogue" we look upward and see that it is a cathedral after all.
In Chapter Five, Professor Jordan attacks the concept of the Canterbury Tales
as dramatic. He is good at setting up straw men to knock down. Note, for
example, his assertion; "But the fact is that the Canterbury Tales circulated as a
gathering of fragments, as an unfulfilled intention." (117) This interpretation of
the facts, presented as a statement of fact, is based on an assertion of Manley's
(116), but ignores completely the contrary evidence presented by Carleton
Brown and many others. When hypothesis becomes fact it is a short step for
conjecture to be equally dignified, "The important point is that Chaucer was
a maker of tales, and in the present case he also made a framework." (117)
Of the individual tales, his discussion of the Merchant's Tale leads to the
conclusion, "Structural and stylistic evidence seems to indicate conclusively that
there is no single viewpoint governing the narrative." (150) This conclusion
is reached by way of assuming a straw man, i. e., that the Merchant alone can
in the dramatic view be the "I." As soon as one shifts the frame of reference
where it belongs, that is, to the mind of the old January, Professor Jordan's
thesis falls. In his discussion of the Knight's Tale, there are many good observations, but they are spoiled by an attempt to relate the humor in the tale to
a shift in point of view. The humor of the tale is simply part of the tale; it is
an essential aspect of its point of view. The discussion of the Miller's Tale is
good, but then Jordan leaves the tale hanging as a thing in itself; "A kind of
miracle has been accomplished, but it is primarily an aesthetic achievement, not
a moral one." (196) This is simply and cavalierly to leave out of account its
relation to the Knight's Tale, and the rest. In his discussion of the Clerk's Tale,
Jordan simply fails to see that its design rests on the" trick" ending, the play
with levels of expectations. (Cf., A Reading of the Canterbury Tales, pp. 136 if.)
His discussion of the Wife's Prologue is a good study of irony, but one should
note how Jordan is led to a statement which sounds almost like a caricature of
the solemnity which he decries in Robertson, "The appetite for sensual gratification which is so dominant in section one is nowhere evident here; lechery has
been displaced by avarice." (222) Chaucer, one assumes, must have slipped
somewhere and become the allegorist Jordan claims he is not.
Suitably enough, since the Canterbury Tales are analogous to a Gothic cathedral,
Jordan ends with the Parson's Tale. I find that the following remark (230)
speaks for itself, as suggesting the quality of Jordan's approach, and I conclude
with it, without comment; " . . . we may justifiably maintain that for ourselves
the presence of the Parson's Tale at the end of the Canterbury Tales is more
important than the tale itself. The knowledge of what it is is more meaningful
and more illuminating than the experience of reading and rereading it."
BERNARD

The State University of New York at Binghamton

F. HUPPE
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The Poetry of Emily Dickinson by Ruth Miller. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan
University Press, 1968. Pp. x + 480. $10.00.

I

Dickinson criticism has characteristically sought authority outside the poems,
summoning d~screte bits of the canon to the service, in many cases, of a biographical thesis. The reasons for this are manifest: the body of poetry is large,
fragmented,_ and linguistically intricate, while the poet's life is a fetching void,
at least in its cornmonplaceness, that invites conjecture through the dense psychological experience in" the poetry. There are exceptions to the persistent extraliterary concern, principally the studies by Charles Anderson, by the writer of
this review, and most recently by Brita Lindberg-Seyersted. In this present smdy,
which is not an exception, Ruth Miller Kriesberg undertakes a criticism the
method of which gives promise but becomes pretentiously diffuse. A grossly
ruminative book, The Poetry of Emily Dickinson laboriously constructs the
argument that the poet was rebuffed by both Samuel Bowles and Thomas
Wentworth Higginson, and consequently turned inward in "communication
with herself," attaining finally at great effort a sustaining contennnent.
Yet Miss Miller describes her objective as nothing less than the "resolution"
of Emily Dickinson's" meaning and manner." The critical method is at once
ambitious and undisciplined, involving, in the author's words, "a new kind of
scrutiny, one that derives not from (Emily Dickinson's] biography or background
or the climate of opinion in the nineteenth century, but from an analysis of
the metaphors and syntax and context of the works themselves." Three separate
contexts of diverse material come under investigation. The first is the Higginson
cluster, which includes that eminent man's article "Letter to a Young Contributor" in the Atlantic Monthly, April, 1862, and Emily Dickinson's letters and
enclosed poems to Higginson in the remainder of that year. The Bowles cluster
contains some of the poet's letters and poems to the editor of the Springfield
Daily Republican from 1860 to 1862 and certain of his letters and newspaper
pieces. The third context consists of the threaded gatherings of poems Emily
Dickinson preserved. From her consideration of these selected materials the
Bowles relationship emerges as Miss Miller's center of concern, a sort of locus
delicti.
In that relationship she discovers "the demoralization" of the poet: "Emily
Dickinson loved Samuel Bowles. . . . She told him so. . . . She met him one
night, began to speak, but failed, failed to make herself understood, failed to
move him or convince him, and when questioned further, failed to articulate
another syllable of the matter. She presented herself and was not taken. She
offered her poems and they were not taken. And although only she knew what
she had meant, she was herself not certain whether she had muffed it or missed
it or let the moment pass her by. She was tormented for many years after that
with the need to justify her silence, with a need to justify her offer. And in her
solitude she began to speak out her endless answer and she created her fantasy
of ardent love. But always she writhed under the shame of this double refusal
and called it her Calvary." That nocturnal confrontation, we are advised, may
be "verified from the many lyrics that have as their action a crucial encounter
which ends with silence and withdrawal." Several poems are invoked, the last
being poem 1072, "Title divine-is mine! " which is said to contain the" evidence
that she called him to her side" in order to defend her poetry and offer her love.
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Supposed details of the meeting are extracted from poem 643" U I ,cQuld suffice
for Him, I knew": U They seem to have stood there a longtsh tIme; the sun
went down, the stars passed over, and still no decision. When at last she does
speak it is scarcely audible" (a debilitation not surprising incidentally, Emily
in this version having stood the night through). Other documents are ransacked.
A letter to Bowles, for example, in which Emily Dickinson pleads U Teach us
to miss you less. • . . You didn't mean to be worse-did you? 11 Miss Miller
describes as Emily's" prose conclusion" of her" signal experience" with Bowles.
In a less literal view, however, these expressions must surely be regarded as the
effusions of a woman trading in the purple commerce of the flourishing friendship cult. Moreover, restoration of the passage which Miss Miller excised from
this letter (erroneously dated 1862 instead of 1864 here) alters our reading:
"Austin told-Saturday morning-that you were not so well. 'Twas Sundownall day-Saturday-and Sunday-such a long Bridge-no news of you-could
cross!" We have, in fact, Emily Dickinson concerned not about Bowles as a
refractory lover, but a sick man!
The sections on Higginson, intended to demonstrate the validity of the critical
method, seem aimless and inconclusive. Prior sections, which retrace the early
editing and the sporadic controversy-ridden publishing history, draw heavily on
Millicent Todd Bingham's version in Ancestors' Brocades. Miss Miller's otherwise
useful discussion of the poet's angle of perception suffers enervation because
of vague critical terminology. On the poem beginning" Their Hight in Heaven
comforts not," for example, Miss Miller comments: II Some readers may detect
in this poem a wistful tone, but that is still somewhat on the middle segment
of the spectrum of emotion." Much labor is expended in the explication of
"There came a Day at Summer's full," drawing upon the poem's II context"the letter to Higginson which accompanied the poem, another poem in the letter,
"variant" poems (the term refers to poems with similar metaphors) and Higginson's Atlantic Monthly article referred to earlier. The conclusion of this discussion is framed as an answer to the sort of cramped question Miss Miller repeatedly
poses in her search for the" meaning" of individual poems. With regard to this
poem, he asks, "if God gives nature, what does the poet give?" Her answer:
" A very close reading, paying particular attention to the unusual syntax, recalling
the context of this poem to be the letter to Higginson and the companion poem,
and relying on variant poems transcribed into the fascicles for further illumination,
we can arrive at an answer: the poet gives her poems."
The constricted reasoning from which Miss Miller's critical approach derives
cannot but produce such hard knots of interpretation. Despite wide sweeps
through materials deemed relevant, often along paths of quite promiscuous
association between poems and letters, it is the single meaning Miss Miller is
after. This critical narrowness is based on the author's assumption that" Emily
Dickinson was above all a poet of occasions." The method then is inevitable:
" As in the case of everything Emily Dickinson wrote, be they letters or poems,
the first question to settle is the circumstance which provoked her to write."
Yet given the best-documented of circumstances, such a method courts irrelevancy
because it treats poems in terms of something else; in the beckoning void of
Dickinson biography, it is an invitation to fiction. Furthennore, only narrow
measures of critical illumination show through such rigid pronouncements as
this: U Higginson understood the quality of poetry to reside in its craftsmanship;

Emily Dli::lili1s'on bOlieved it resided in the subject matter." (This seems to be
contradicted further on: U Take the poems with the most banal,.' the most trite and'
hackneyed themes we can find, they will be -great poems nevertheless" b~cause
of the manner of rendering.") Here is Miss Miller's': cohuheht au' the famous'"
poem" A Bird came down the Walk": "This poem has no message, no' lesson;
it has no biographical or historical significance. But for itself we cherish it.
That bird is a real bird; he eats and drinks and jerks about as birds do when
they are on the ground; he flies off with a different kind of motion, it is true,
but so do real birds fly." Distorted readings OCCUI, the most extraordinary
perhaps on page 127 where Miss Miller, inspecting the poem" I Faith' is a fine
invention" in the light of the poet's accompanying note to Bowles, concludes
that the poem really demands of Bowles U Publish [my 1 poems in the Springfield
paper. Print them clear in the small newspaper." Finally, there is a bland
dismissal of the crucial problem of when the poems were composed. Ie It serves
no purpose any longer," Miss Miller writes, Ie to bemuse ourselves with the
riddle of chronology. At this distance from the events of 1858-1862 we must
be satisfied with an approximation."
Miss Miller's chapter on the fascicles is intended to show that the contextual
approach holds here, too; i. e., poems in a single gathering are mutually illuminating. A chart and a "blueprint" are presented in support of this view and
indeed they are said to be applicable in all cases: "So similar are the fascicles
it seems possible to chart one and obtain a blueprint for all." The principle
behind the construction of the fascicles, Miss Miller writes, is "in a word,
dramatic." Further on Miss Miller declares that the fascicles "do not all say
the same thing, but they all do have an intrinsic dramatic narrative as their
central structure." We are not told the extent of revision of the blueprint made
necessary by Professor Ralph Franklin's proposed re-ordering (accepted in toto
by Miss Miller) of some of the packets. Fascicle 12, the single g_athering presented
for demonstration, is described as IC a long link-poem, a single poem composed of
discrete but intricately related parts." The relatedness depends upon Miss Miller's
enormously capacious concept of "modulation," by which an illusion of purposeful order is maintained: "The final poem brings together all the acts and
images that opened the fascicle: the vision of course has cleared; the window
has modulated to a mirror; the timid heart that split earlier has modulated to
a flawed soul that winks; the news that might strike her dead has become the
lightning that does not frighten the sound soul. ..."
Despite the author's claim that "Emily Dickinson's literary influences are
as much a surprise as anything one can say about this unique poet," the evidence
presented is not uniformly convincing. Miss Miller mistakes hardy cliches that
clot Dicldnson's poetry for borrowings (she sometimes calls them "echoes") or
she seizes upon single words from which she hastily extrapolates. For example,
the lines II Twas when the sea's tremendous roar / A little bark assailed" from
Hymns of the Ages (1860) she says supposedly triggered the Dickinson" variant"
"If my Bark sink / Tis to another sea ... ," lines of course from William Ellery
Channing. Lengthy and unanalyzed excerpts from books Emily Dickinson might
have read (the relevance to her poetry is not clear) appear in the voluminous
back material. Throughout this long book a confining literal mindedness obstructs
imaginative critical movement, as when, for a final example, Miss Miller turns
repeatedly to Webster's 1847 dictionary for the "meaning" of words in
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particular poems. The result is that the full performance of a poe?I is slighted
while the tracking down of meaning proceeds narrowly along a line from the
poem's supposed "occasion." The method, on the other hand, neither rigorous
nor always tactful, induces elaboration which in turn ravels out into misplaced
attention in irrelevant comers.
DAVID PORTER

University of Massachusetts

Blake's Humanism by John Beer. New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1968.
Pp. xiii + 269. $9.00.
Much literary criticism is still being written from the view that some unknown
number of close analyses of individual works, compiled and collated, yield a
picture of something we might call "literature." If this were true, then we
might also argue that the interestingness of criticism inspired by a particular
writer reflects the quality of his work, that the greater interest of Blake criticism
over, say, critical writings on Coleridge is some sign of Blake's pre-eminence.
That this canon would be false reminds us that the relation between criticism
and literature is parabolic, tangential and incomplete.
Less eccentric, in the case of Blake, might be the assertion that he has more
successfully conditioned his critics than any of the other major English poets.
In this he is much like Thelonious l\.1onk, the jazz pianist, whose compositions
are so structured that convincing improvisations on them by other musicians
seem bound to echo the temperament of their inventor. There is no question
of improvising or significantly qualifying the original. A tacit acceptance of
the sponsoring conception is always implied in the performance. In the tight
game that Blake plays with his readers and critics, an unstated rule seems to be
that the player is seldom allowed to retrieve a bone of understanding without
swallowing a morsel of assent. By the time he has gone through the labors of
analysis and explication, his independent judgment as an evaluator has been
deeply compromised, co-opted. To quarrel with Blake, we must use terms so
heavily saturated by his frame of reference that our counter-arguments become
so much reinforcement of his ideology. And if we too strenuously resist this
frame of reference, our counter-thrusts fall out of bounds as irrelevant.
All of this helps explain why virtually no criticism in the traditional sense
has been written on Blake. Significant works about him are invariably booklength studies, rather like Biblical commentaries: the baroque apologetics of
Frye, the compendious glossaries of Damon, the evangelical paraphrases of
Harold Bloom. Even less pure and less tractable in critical dialogue is that higher
form of Blake criticism, the creative borrowings and assimilations of poets like
Yeats and Cummings and in novels such as Finnegan's Wake, Tbe Crock of Gold,
The Horse's Mouth, Henderson the Rain King and untraceable others.
Apart from Frye's II Blake After Two Centuries," the only Blake criticism
of the classical sort, in the manner of Johnson's essay on Shakespeare or Arnold's
on Wordsworth, is Eliot's short piece in The Sacred Wood, treasurable for its
rarity among writings on Blake as an essay in literary judgment, spacious in
perspective, conversational, pointed, confident in its attempt to arrive, in brief
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compass, at a whole view of the man. His sharpest impression, however. that
Blake's genius "sadly lacked ..• a framework of accepted and traditional ideas
which would have prevented him from indulging in a philosophy of his own,
and concentrated his attention upon the problems of a poet," shows the hazard
of this approach, since it asks Blake's genius to be something other than what
it cenainly was.
Professor Beer's Blake's Humanism, as it opens, promises new resolutions in
Blake criticism; it suggests his attempt to hold an independent course before
Blake's usual compromisation and co-optation, and before the precedents of
Blake's previous critics, without falling into the misunderstanding dissympathy
of Eliot's pronouncement. The prospect is neither that of a handbook or guide
through Blake nor of an Olympian resume, but something of both, essayistic and
discursive, which will "place" Blake, but upon a foundation of careful and
precise readings. Rather than pursue Blake through one "key" idea, as in
several monographs on the poet, Beer seeks Blake's "more complex identity"
through theme and motif of his poetry and pictures. The manner recalls the
tough-minded tack of F. R. Leavis; what seems offered, a revaluation of Blake
within the context of some great tradition.
The book falls short of its admirable ambitions, however. Its theme-Blake's
effort to supplant a fruitless dialectic between Reason and Energy with a fruitful
dialectic between Desire and Vision (the levels of four-fold vision, respectively)
and restore human nature to its supra-natural basis-emerges obscurely from
the rather finicky and sometimes dubious explications that the discussion settles
into. Along with such motifs as Blake's use of light-dark imagery, this theme
as here developed makes a thinnish net in which to catch Blake's complexity.
Sharp insights alternate with stretches of drossy paraphrase. The gains are
valuable, however. Beer surpasses his predecessors, in my opinion, in his reading
of Visions of the Daugbters of Albion, and draws some bold, clarifying patterns
upon Tbe Song of Los. An appendix uncovers an unmistakable debt owed
Dryden's translation of Chaucer's Knigbt's Tale by Blake's Gates of Paradise.
Another offers an interesting paradigm of Blake's mythology.
The book's failure to crystallize for the reader a whole view of Blake is
perhaps related to its author's feeling that Blake's vision is itself not a whole
one. In a final chapter (" Unwanted Prospera "), Beer suggests that there is
something human lacking in Blake's humanism, some quantity found in Fielding,
Cobbett, Wordsworth and Dickens; "some final barrier, reared within his
personality, prohibited him from trusting the earth whole-heartedly." This sounds
to me like accusing Blake of having lost something he intentionally and clcarsightedly left behind, something very near to those things that Christ and Tolstoy
relinquished.
It is a commonplace that when we write about Blake we really write about
ourselves (the most interesting part of his game). More telling, possibly, is
what each of his critics who hopes to pursue him in the" desarts wild" beyond
the cultured gardens of conventional criticism, and faced with his co-optative
demands that we surrender much of our usual operational gear, refuses to
surrender.
CLYDE TAYLOR

California State CoJlege, Long Beacb
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John Ford and the Traditional Moral Order by Mark Stavig. Madison: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 1968. Pp. xx 225. $6.95.

,b<

Does John Ford attack or support Uthe traditional moral order I'? 1\1r. Stavig
argues for the latter view, finding in both Ford's early, non-dramatic works and
in his plays an advocacy of Christianity, Platonism, and neo-Stoicism. Ford's
traditionalism prevails even in his two most sensational tragedies, 'Tis Pity She's
a Whore and Love's Sacrifice; hence one errs not only if he sees Ford championing libertinism or unbridled individualism but also if he thinks the playwright
disinterested in ethics while preoccupied with aesthetic effect and psychological
analysis.
As an introduction to his book-as well as a justification for it-, Mr. Stavig
reviews nineteenth and twentieth-century Fordian criticism. He properly dis~
tinguishes between" the Hazlitt school," which condemned Ford as a decadent
romantic, and "the Lamb school," which praised him as a sympathetic portrayer
of human suffering; he next notes S. P. Sherman's conception of the dramatist
as a critic of society, then turns to later scholarship (that of M. Joan Sargeaunt,
M. C. Bradbrook, Una Ellis-Fermor, H. J. Oliver, and Clifford Leech), which
he describes as agreeing upon Ford's avoidance of moral judgments. Preferable
to these approaches, according to the author, are those of Irving Ribner and
Robert Ornstein, who in recent studies "stress the traditional vision of Jacobean
dramatists ••• dominated by Christian rather than secular philosophy" (xix).
'iVith Mr. Stavig's denial of Ford's libeninism I must concur. 'Tis Pity She's
a Whore, for example, is no plea for incest. Discussing Ford's most controversial
play in what strikes me as the book's central chapter, he points out the gradual
deterioration of Giovanni, who, after his rejection of Friar Bonaventura's orthodox
advice, proceeds from incest to blasphemy, adultery, and murder and remains a
lustful lover throughout. I also agree with Mr. Stavig's contention that traditional
morality pervades Ford's non-dramatic works: that Fame's iVIemorial praises the
Earl of Devonshire as an ideal coumer rather than as the adulterous lover of
Penelope Rich, that Christ's Bloody Sr.;;eat presents the doctrine of redemption,
and that both A Line of Life and The Golden Mean preach neo-Stoicism. And I
find plausible his novel interpretation of the prose pamphlet Honor Triumphant
as satire, ridiculing by means of overstatement and deliberately inept illustration
the excesses of pseudo-Platonism.
My principal disagreement with Mr. Stavig concerns the extent of U the
traditional moral order" in Ford's plays. In my opinion, he finds too much.
One of the book's main points, sometimes stated and often implied, is that Ford
undercuts his tragic protagonists (Giovanni in 'Tis Pity, Fernando in Love's
Sacrifice, Ithocles in The Bmken Heart, and Warbeck in Perkin Warbeck) by
satirically portraying them as II the rationalizing fool," a term coined by Mr.
Stavig. No audience can take Giovanni seriously, for instance, because II he
transforms himself into a grotesque and almost ludicrous figure who elicits onr
shock and at times amusement at his arguments" (p. 96). To buttress this
position, the author in his early chapters has set up several premises: Ford is
capable of subtle satire (as in Honor Triumpbant), supports traditional morality
(as in all of his non-dramatic works), and writes for a Caroline audience much
more idealistic, much less cynical, than is generally supposed. Regarding the last
premise, Mr. Stavig argues that Jacobean pessimism and Stuart decadence have
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been exaggerated and, in addition, that most of the Cavalier plays written for
Queen Henrietta Maria's coterie staunchly support Platonism.

Mr. Stavig's view of Fordian tragedy is provocative, and the premises he
marshals on its behalf can be defended. The plays themselves, however, would
seem to challenge his thesis. 'Tis Pity She's a Whore, while not condoning
incest, presents Giovanni more sympathetically than he indicates.

IT Ford

intends us to see Giovanni as a "rationalizing fool," why does he expend
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much effort in alienating us from Giovanni's antagonist, the cuckolded Soranzo?
Before the violent final scene, Soranzo has seduced, then abandoned Hippolita,

dragged Annabella by the hair, and prepared a death-trap for Giovanni; Soranzo's
confidant, Vasques, has added to our hostility by his brutal treatment of the
servant Putana. Thus, when Giovanni defiantly accepts Vasques' invitation to
the deadly banquet, we side with Giovanni in his fat~l fight with Soranzo.
Mr. Stavig also maintains that Giovanni's arguments with Friar Bonaventura

about incest make him ludicrous. But this is debatable, for in the play the
Church's concept of justice, as practiced by both a cardinal and the friar himseH,
is far from adequate. In short, whereas Mr. Stavig sees Ford espousing traditional morality and belittling Giovanni, I see the playwright inducing a double,
or paradoxical, view that depicts the folly of incest but is compassionate towards

those involved. I differ similarly with him about Perkin Warbeck. He states
that the audience must decide whether Warbeck, in falsely claiming the English
throne, is hypocritical or demented, and that the latter judgment is unavoidable

(p. 183). My interpretation is more favorable to Warbeck, for again I find the
dramatist resorting to paradox: the protagonist is seH-deluded and politically
incompetent yet personally courageous and admirable. Traditional moral order

certainly is supported, especially in Ford's characterization of Heniy VII, but not
to the extent of denigrating Warbeck.
Nor do I share Mr. Stavig's view of Love's Sacrifice. He asserts that its three
ptincipals (Fernando, Bianca, and the Duke of Pavia) are rationalizing fools
since they hold, II improper views of love" and concludes, "The satiric impulse
dominates, and the audience would probably have come away from the playas

much amused by the foolishness of love as appalled by the tragedy of it"
(p. 122). My interpretation of Love's Sacrifice is quite different, and is stated
at length in a forthcoming book on the playwright. Briefly, my thesis holds
that illicit sexual intercourse (lust, with this meaning, is the drama's key word)
constitutes the one unforgivable sin in Ford's Pavia. Bianca's husband, the duke,
erroneously believes that she and Fernando are guilty of II lust," so kills her;
when he learns that they are not, remorse drives him to suicide. Herein, I
believe, lies the tragedy. One possible objection to this view concerns its emphasis
on Bianca's technical chastity; after all, the duke discovers his wife and Fernando
embracing. My answer would be, simply, that in the world of Love's Sacrifice
only II lust" justifies homicide, for all personae consistently accept such a code.
Furthennore, unlike Mr. Stavig, I do not think that Queen Henrietta Maria's
coterie would have responded with "amused superiority"; chiefly because of
its very interest in and familiarity with various forms of Platonism, the group
would have been much more receptive to and less puzzled by the play's unusual
moral code than are twentieth-century readers.
DoNALD

University of Missouri

K.

ANDERSON, JR.
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Hart Crane: An Introduction to the Poetry by Herbert A. Leibowitz. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Pp. xii

+ 308.

$7.50.

During the past year, within a broader interest in the literature of the thirties,
a growing effort has developed in Hart Crane criticism to turn itself into a
major industry. Numerous articles in magazines, full-length critical studies by
R. W. B. Lewis and Herbert A. Leibowitz, a catalogue of Crane material by
Kenneth A. Lohf, and incessant buzzings of the imminent arrival of John
Unterecker's long-promised critical biography and of a new edition of the
selected letters have proved enough indication for those purveyors of the
market to sense that the time may be right to buy low and wait for the coming
boom. Certainly, over the years, Crane stock has proved a durable, though not
a high-yield investment. Books by Philip Horton (1937), Brom Weber (1948),
H. D. Rowe (1955), L. S. Dembo (1960), Samuel Hazo (1963), Vincent Quinn
(1963), Monroe K. Spears (1965), and Alan Trachtenberg (1965) stand as evidence
of Crane's appeal. Nevertheless, the objections raised earlier in Crane's career
still obtain and may cause the more conservative stockbuyer to think tw'ice
before investing.
These early objections to Crane by critics like R. P. Blackmur, Yvor Winters,
and Allen Tate concern his Romanticism and his idealism~as Romanticism and
idealism in general and as his specific brands of both; and, although it is fashionable at the moment to play down these critics, it is dangerous to discount out-ofhand what they have to say. Their objections are generally to Crane's views
which accepted reason as the source of all evil, the automatic man as a mystic,
and any change as progress. Such views tended toward a loss of ego rather than
a projection of it. In these critics' work, ego, as a matter of course, tends to
take priority, usually in the form of will, whereas in Crane's writing, ego gives
up its priority to sensuality as man dissolves his will in sensual perceptions. As
Winters points out, carried to its logical conclusion, this leads to suicide and
insanity, and the image of the American Ideal which, in the absence of vision,
it projects is certainly sensual excitement rather than an archetype of futurity.
There is no hero, no pius Aeneas nor cosmopolitan man embracing contradictions
here to rescue our self projections from the process of dissolutions into already
realized artifacts.
Complicating these objections~often part of the same feeling-is an unstated
objection to Crane, a rejection of the notion that a homosexual can speak for
America. Aren't Crane's confusions (his refusal to formulate clearly a vision)
the confusions of a homosexual (a refusal like his life to accept himself finally
for that), a failure to transform these tendencies into an archetype? Wasn't
Crane's real failure a failure to understand that archetypes come from life and
past literature and not spontaneously from imagination? One feels that he would
have fared much better had he drawn the mantle of Whitman about him more
as Vergil drew about him the mantle of previous poets and poems. But, perhaps,
too, only in American criticism are these prudish questions ever asked, for they
are asked also of Whitman, who seems indisputably major. No one, for example,
in art criticism asks if Michelangelo's homosexuality is a problem in the Sistine
Chapel, or, in French criticism, if Arthur Rimbaud's homosexuality diminishes
his poetry. If the artist is good or intense enough, these matters are minor, for
as Samuel Johnson remarked long ago of Shakespeare's characters, at moments
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of emotional intensity all people speak alike. Yet, a tendency in criticism today
to make the artwork the artist allows questions to be asked which should not
obtain. I mention this, not because I want to scandalize anyone into accepting
Crane, but simply because criticism has tended to make out of Crane a shadow
figure, an echo of Fedallah whom one cannot bargain with, for even the most
innocent-seeming bargains a critic might make have in them seeds of a destruction
like Ahab's.
Even when these objections are not stated overtly, they invade the rhetoric:
Crane is a U seductive" poet, etc.; and even those who try to redeem him do so
by the same rhetoric of enticement-" dazzling," "inspiring," "prophetic," "transforming." The need for such a rhetoric by critics who have no intention of
promoting homosexuality suggests something deeper-that perhaps only through
some reconciliation with her shadow figures can America attain her cultural
fulfillment. This last explains a kind of urgency in those favorably disposed to
Crane to overstate his case and overlook his faults. It also explains the unreasoned
repressiveness of his detractors. In either case, despite whatever attempts at
depicting his pedestrian upbringing, his job disappointments, his friendships,
etc., the rhetoric belies Crane's humanity for a concept of Crane as the "good"
or II evil" magus, the superhuman planner of the epic to direct or pervert the
American myth in "The Bridge." In that failure of grasping the humanity of
Crane, the criticism has failed to grasp the humanity of the inconsistencies
inherent in the poetic personaL
UnfortUnately in Leibowitz's study, he does not come to grips sufficiently with
these larger problems before he tackles the smaller ones. His book divides into
two parts, the first five chapters dealing with the relationship of Crane to his
poetry and the remaining :five chapters with stylistic analyses. In the opening
half, a lateral sliding from biography to biographical criticism to explication
de texte to generic criticism forestalls a going deeply into th~ subject. In this
half a certain fuzziness of style and thought adversely complements the fuzziness
of Crane's thought and style, and it extends to both Leibowitz's perception and
his expression. So, for example, when critics complain of Crane's rhetorical
faults (his confused depiction of the Ideal, not his pursuit of it), Leibowitz
counters their objections with an irrelevant philosophical argument (an" unseen
power" exists beyond the material, something few Crane detractors would
take issue with); and when they argue against a Cusanian philosophical
position which insists that the Ideal can only be apprehended in matter, he responds
in Ionesco fashion again in terms of an optimistic view of life which he had
been willing to play down in the opening pages-though to his credit he admitted
there "a closeness to life." Likewise, in matters of rhetoric, he fails to bring
his writing into organization and coherence and to develop himself a clear
image of the poet to bring his parts into line. To obscure both failings, he
peppers his prose with language like" dazzling," "bustling," "jaunty," "bizarre,"
etc.
The fuzziness is unfortUnate because when Leibowitz gets to the matters of
diction, imagery, and poetic forms the book occasions mildly perceptive and
graceful statements (as there are in Crane's own writing and in keeping with
what E. M. Forster once called" pseudo-scholarship "). Yet, before one condemn
him too harshly for these faults-which, alas, obtain to Lewis and to Crane
criticism in general, I should like to suggest to any would-be investor that the

W6
real problem in Han Crane criticism is not the poetry which can be catalogued
and defined, but either vividness (an inability to come to clear conclusions
about the "message" of Crane) or ambiguity (an attempt to disguise a vividlyrealized" message" in order to make it more palatable to an audience predisposed
to reject it) t and that before any new investments are made in the stock, the
investor look first carefully into his willingness to plumb these matters.
JEROME MAZZARO

State University of New York at Buffalo
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Two Concepts of Allegory: A Study of Shakespeare's" The Tempest" and the
Logic of Allegorical Expression by A. D. Nuttall. New York: Barnes &
Noble, Inc., 1967. Pp. xiv + 175. $7.00.

'v

Allegory means what it has always meant, Nuttall assures us at the end of his
second chapter: "It seems better, on the whole, to define allegory, modestly
and loosely, as a described set of things in narrative sequence standing for a
different set of things in temporal or para temporal sequences; in short, a complex
narrative metaphor. Having said so much, we can allow with equanimity that
allegory is the instrument par excellence of the metaphysician, that de Lorris
is no less an allegorist in the moments of mysteriously intimate realism than he
is anywhere else, and that what the world has always called allegories are, after
all, allegories" (p.48).
Agreeing with the traditional view that allegory "says one thing and means
another," Nuttall is neither concerned with a general theory, as Northrop Frye,
nor with structural analysis of allegorical elements in order to investigate, as
does Angus Fletcher, the" essence of the mode." His major point is that allegory
and metaphysics are in practice closely allied; and he therefore takes issue with
C. S. Lewis for making a division between allegory and sacramentalism, and with
Erich Auerbach for being "too rigid in his definition of the practical scope of
figura" (p. 26). Arguing against the critical practice of setting allegory in
opposition to transcendentalism, Nuttall maintains that "allegory was, in fact,
a very frequent medium for the expression of transcendentalist metaphysics"
(p.152).
The first chapter briefly reviews a few examples of allegoristic Tempest
criticism of the last century to show an affinity between allegory and metaphysics;
such a connection, Nuttall implies, gives him license to attack C. S. Lewis and
Erich Auerbach for separating the two. But it is disconcerting to be asked to
put great faith in the logic of a methodology that aims at critical guilt by asso~
ciation. Even if Nuttall is right in showing in Chapter One that Edward R.
Russell's proposal (1876) that Prospero is akin to God is "too bold to be
plausible" (p. 9), and that the selections from allegoristic criticism are silly,
must it necessarily follow in Chapter Two that C. S. Lewis and Erich Auerbach
are equally culpable?
To support the view that allegory is a metaphysical expression in which image
and concept blend to present multiple meanings and metaphysical associations,
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Nuttall traces in his third chapter-" The Psychological Basis "-the confusion
of concept and image, and postulates the existence of what he calls "non-specific

imagery" that appropriately describes mental phenomena. His explanation follows: .. This chapter, as its heading indicates, was designed to supply a psychological basis for the mysterious thing-quality (the • instantially viewed universal ')
which emerged from Chapters I and II. I have argued that this entity can enjoy
a logically spurious existence as long as confusion of concept and image prevails.
Grant me this confusion and I can provide in the 'non-specified image' something

which can be thought of as general and at the same time envisaged as a
mysterious individual; in Plato or in allegory, Pride itself is proud: in Price's

psychology, the mental image Yellow is itself yellow" (pp. 71-72).
It is clear from these quotations that the style of the book does not help
to clarify positions which are themselves unclear. To talk about abstractions
without getting tangled in complexities is often an impossibility, but language
need not resemble parody that will someday find its place in an Allegory Perplex.
The phrasing in NuttaU's third chapter, .. The Psychological Basis," is a fine
example of its kind. "I shall,1! he writes, "be arguing in this chapter for a
connexion between the concretely instantialized, self-predicable universal and
mental imagery, not because a mental image can ever be a universal, but because

they are easily confused" (p. 50). (One guesses that the author anticipated a
confused reader, for he offers the following footnote as illumination: "Any
universal which is regarded as an instance of itself will count as 'self-predicable.'
Thus, if we suppose that pride is something which is itself, very, very proud,

we make pride itself an instance of pride, and by the same token we predicate
pride of pride.") And his next paragraph continues in the sam~ way: "The
concept in question is marked by a quality of spurious sensuousne~ a density
as of material objects, which directs our attention to the imagination."
It becomes clear in the last chapter, which discusses The Tempest, that
Nuttall's arguments are meant to justify the intuitive critic who is unable or
unwilling to demonstrate conclusions but believes, nevertheless, that they are
essentially true. This reviewer is led to assume that Nuttall would readily assent
to the dictum, "I feel; therefore, it is." He seems to presume that because he
reasons in a particular way, Shakespeare must have reasoned in the same way.
His summary of The Tempest, he writes, "was of course selective. It may be as
well to proclaim here the principle of selection involved. I was concerned to show
Shakespeare's preoccupation, throughout the play, with the more nearly subliminal
aspects of perception. It is as if Shakespeare himself became concerned, as I
was in the third and fourth chapters of this book, to retreat into the preconceptual area of the mind. The chapters and the play have, in a sense, very

similar subject-matter" (p. 157).
By what process does Nuttall put himself in touch with

U

the preconceptual

area of the mind"? Instead of Jung's racial unconscious, we find that a cultural
unconscious is the key to most things. In the founh chapter, titled U The Use
of the Imagination in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," he argues that

the formal way of Elizabethan poetty reflects a formal manner of imagining
reality. Because imagination was schooled in Ignatian spiritual exercises and in
"the art of memory," it gave to artists and the public a Common fund of images
and symbols. "All the spurious-seeming properties of 'density,' instantiality,
spatial characteristics, and so on, we have laid at the door of the imagination....
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When we suggest that the spectators in Ludlow Castle in 1634 seemed to see
the form of Alice Egerton brightening into the Form of Chastity itself, we
suggest that this curious excited configuration was made possible by the availability of a shared mental world of instantialized universals; and that this world
was, once more, the work of the usurping imagination" (p. 106).
Nuttall feels that his own subliminal feelings are v~lid for the an and literature
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries because he feels himself attuned to
the imagination of the times. The Tempest, he argues, deals subliminally with
what its audience feels, and since he is attuned to what an audience would feel,
it follows that he is attuned to what the play is all about. Just as Pride itself
is proud, the experience of characters within Shakespeare's play is the same as
that produced in the audience by the play. We are asked to believe that The
Tempest is "for much of its length, about people configurating, imagining without
actualizing, and so on.... in The Tempest the prominence given to the ambiguous
lower reaches of our conceptual and perceptual apparatus infects all ontological
dogmatism with uncertainty. Shakespeare repeatedly restricts his characters to
the primitive stages of perception in their apprehension of the island and its
denizens. In this way he builds up a sense of a shimmering multiplicity of
levels, which, together with the gratuitous operations of the supernatural, produce
in the audience a state of primitive apprehension similar to that in which the
characters find themselves" (p. 157).
Many readers will not share Nuttall's feelings about The Tempest. They will
question his intuition that "It is overwhelmingly probable that Shakespeare's
love for Mr. W. H. was at least partially sexual" (p. 127), and that" Shakespeare
may well have found himself in the uncomfortable position which frequently
assails homosexuals or quasi-homosexuals, forced to oscillate between manly
affection and erotic ungovernable passion" (p. 127). They will resent a criticism
which presents litde detailed analysis but simply recounts a man's tastes and
views as though they were self-validating. While we may be happy to accept
the intuitions of artists and writers, the professional critic owes his reader a
little more than assertion. When Nuttall says, "There must, I feel, be a connexion, though I am not able to expound it, between Moore's attribution of
unanalysability to 'good' and Shakespeare's' deification' of love" (p. 132), many
readers will question the validity of such a feeling in literary analysis. They will
question the value of private musings whose public exposure serves no purpose,
as when Nuttall writes: "Whether there is a real connexion between the ideas
of Shakespeare, Keats and Anselm, I do not know. I have an intuition that there
is, but I cannot pretend to elucidate it satisfactorily" (p.134).
U Is The Tempest allegorical?"
Nuttall asks at the end of his work. U If I
have done my work properly," he replies, (( the question should have shrunk in
importance. The principal subject of this book has been to show that allegorical
poetry is more curiously and intimately related to life than was allowed by the
petrifying formula of C. S. Lewis" (p. 119). In terms of this book the question
may have become irrelevant rather than less important, for having been led up
a mountain of preliminaries to view The Tempest, we find that we stand on a
molehill. In the end, our view has to be supplied for us because our guide
has not given us sufficient information and analysis to see things for ourselves,
and Nuttall concedes: "I am willing to give a few arbitrary rulings" (p. 159).
The last of these is that "the suggestiveness of The Tempest is metaphysical
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in tendency, and the indeterminate concepts adumbrated do have the logical
oddity which we have followed through from the first chapter. Love is conceived
as a supernatural force, and any number of protestations of metaphor and
apologetic inverted commas cannot do away with the fact that a sort of deification, and therefore a fortiori reification has taken place" (p. 160). My intuition
tells me that no matter what flaw there may be in C. S. Lewis' theory of allegory,
his study of medieval tradition in Tbe Allegory of Love brings us closer to the
literary experience than Nuttall's intuitions.
Wlu..IAM ROSEN

The University of Connecticut

Civil Disobedience and Moral Law in Nineteenth-Century American Philosophy
by Edward H. Madden. Seattle: Universiry of Washington Press, 1968.
Pp. 214. $7.50.
Historians and philosophers both are obliged to ascertain what if any connections there are between general philosophical positions and attitudes toward social
reform, and this is the task assumed by Professor Edward Madden in his stUdy
of a group of American thinkers often neglected by philosophers (who think
their philosophical writings relatively derivative and inconsequential) and historians of ideas (who find their writings too technical), His findings call for
a reinterpretation of the academic tradition in American thought.
Misleading though it probably is to speak of an "academic -tradition" in
American philosophy. I do so in order to draw attention to the fact that Mr.
Madden's title disguises the somewhat diffuse character of his book while
obscuring one of its most interesting features. "Civil disobedience" is an issue
only in the first two thirds of the study, when the anti-slavery movement and
abolitionism presented problems for Protestant educators and transcendentalists
alike. In the last section on Chauncey Wright and Charles Eliot Norton,
Darwinism is a comparable center of attention. Throughout the book, utilitarianism in a variety of versions is the theory which complicates issues in ethical
and social thought for minds as diverse as Francis Wayland, James B. Thayer,
and Charles Eliot Norton. The strength of Mr. Madden's study lies in his
careful attention to the interactions among all these philosophical and social
positions and to the reforming activities engaged in by the philosophers. Their
activities constitute "parables for our own times," Madden insists, and enable
him to underscore at times the wisdom of moderate reform within the conservative tradition that he discusses from time to time, notably in his final
chapter.
That final chapter is entitled H The Conservative Tradition" and while the
chapter is confined to the single case of Charles Eliot Norton, it brings to the
fore the question of the essential conservatism of the group whom Madden
discusses and the question of what nexus of ideas, attitudes, or affiliations binds
the group together. He nowhere suggests that they constitute one or more
"schools" in philosophy. Indeed he takes pains to elucidate the considerable range
of opinion and activity among them, from Wayland's Christian theism to Nonon's
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later scepticism and utilitarianism, and to differentiate between the ethical positions of thinkers who share the same intellecrual origins Of combat the same
antagonists. A pronounced interest in historical transitions is displayed when
Madden traces the decline of refornllst zeal at Oberlin after the Civil War,
or when he insists on the basic changes or reversals in social ethics experienced
by George William Curtis in the 1850's and by Norton under the impact of
Chauncey Wright. II Tradition" seems the apt term for what Madden is
examining, but his critical apparatus does not enable him to define one or to
account fully enough for the interaction of ideas and social reform within the
traditions he describes.
He begins by delineating the "Academic Orthodoxy" or i< new orthodoxy"
which dominated the newer colleges, notably Oberlin, that were founded as
the "liberal thrust of Protestant Christianity" (responsive eventually to the
" intuitionist" theories that became ascendent among continental philosophers,
Unitarians, and transcendentalists) challenged the older common-sense Scottish
philosophy and the strict Calvinists entrenched in such bastions as Princeton.
Much of the first and best half of Mr. Madden's book is devoted to the ethical
positions and anti-slavery activities of the Oberlin presidents. The differentiations
he makes between the ethical stands taken by Asa Mahan, Charles Finney, and
James Fairchild are placed in the context of Oberlin history, national politics
in the pre-Civil-War decades, and such concrete events as the flight of fugitive
slaves and John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry. What Madden means by
Oberlin's "middle-ground" reformist tradition, founded on "deliberate dedication" rather than" playfulness or enthusiasm," is made clear; its decline when the
relatively cautious Fairchild replaces Mahan as President is understandable within
the context of firm but clearly moderate, "militant" but "solid," anti-slavery
reform that characterized the Oberlin community.
Yet there is an unanswered question that becomes more troublesome when
Madden moves out of the institutional context provided by the Oberlin community. What connection is there between the structure of a philosopher's
ethical position and his attitude toward reform, when the utilitarian theory that
was the basis of social reform for Bentham and Mill was joined in Fairchild's
case to a distincd), conservative social ethic? One may conclude, as Madden
does in his fifth chapter, that" there is little or no connection benveen concepts
of moral law and commitments on specific moral issues." He must then perforce
seek the coherence of authors' careers in the dynamics of social and historical
process, which may include their theories but cannot be expected to be governed
by those theories. Some such necessity apparently leads Madden to raise
historical questions more often in the later sections of his book, but his historical
method is not adequate to the task he sets for himself.
For instance, his chapter on transcendentalism (the second important current
in nineteenth-centmy moral philosophy) makes the familiar distinctions benveen
Emerson's scepticism about social reform, Thoreau's more radical U anarchism,"
and Theodore Parker's militant abolitionism, in the context of the basic tenets
of their transcendentalism. But his discussion is not full enough to take account
of the impact on Emerson and Thoreau of the same John Bro\VIl raid and other
historical incidents of the 1850's whose importance he recognized in discussing
the Oberlin group. He insists that a U commitment to civil disobedience follows
directly from the transcendental notion of the Higher Law," and declares tenta-
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tively that" Some philosophies, perhaps, carry stronger motivations to action than
others," yet he notes that even such activist "philosophies, like any others, can
be accepted and yet remain inoperative . . . in a person's life." In George

William Curtis Mr. Madden can righdy find a transcendentalist in whom the
ethical imperatives of his position, enforced by the sentiments of his wife's family,
were strong enough to give firm sanction to moderate antiMslavery activities
(non-violent, passively evading the Fugitive Slave law but refusing to defy it
outright, sharply differentiating his own strategy of "piecemeal" reform from
the nillitancy of Wendell Phillips). But Mr. Madden has no way of explaining
why in Curtis the imperatives of transcendentalism were operative by so much
and no more.
It does not clarify the issue or solve the question of Curtis's role in history
to invoke the n conflict school" of historians (Charles Beard, T umer, and
Parrington) who mistakenly emphasize political ideologies and discount the
reality of the moral issues which Curtis and Madden find to be generative in
history, or the "consensus school" of more recent historians (including Boorstin)
whose "anti-intellectualism" (as Madden unfairly brands it) discounts moral

systems and conflict almost entirely. For such historical generalizations (whatever
their validity in the writings of the historians themselves) are not brought
analytically to bear on the details of Curtis's life or the development of his moral
and social philosophy in their actual historical context.
Likewise Mr. Madden's careful differentiation between Norton's early" Burkean" views and the social criticism founded on his later agnosticism and
utilitarianistn, illuminaring and important though his findings are, is marred by
his attempt to dismiss the significance of Norton's gentility and to remove him
from the conservative tradition where Clinton Rossiter has righdy placed him.
The stUdy of American conservatism can profit from the distinctions and necessary
qualifications which Mr. Madden's stUdy of Chauncey Wright and Norton brings
to light. But the complexities of that conservative tradition~the constraining
pressure of economic and academic realities on ideas and philosophical systemsand the place within it of a liberally inclined but almost immobilized man of
letters-call for a method more genuinely historical than the philosophical analysis
that Mr. Madden provides.
LAUBENCE B. HOLLAND

Princeton University

The Novels of Anthony Powell by Robert K. Morris. Pittsburgh: University
of Pittsburgh Press, 1968. Pp. xi + 252. $2.95.
Just in the nick of time Robert K. Morris' book, The Novels of Anthony
Powell, has appeared. Looking on as Nick Jenkins, the narrator, and his companions perfonn the rather intricate patterns in A Dance to the Music of Time,
reade~

have come to the point at which they must ask: "Now where does that

disastrous party take place? The one at which Nick meets Sunny Farebrother
for the fitst time. Is it A Question of Upbringing? A Buyer's Market? With
more than two hundred characters-as Morris numbers them-who drop in and
OUt of the individual novels and serve as items of conversation in still others,
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keeping track of the social milieu which infonns a particular novel and the
events occurring within it becomes more difficult than charting the steady course
of Mrs. Proudie of Barsetshire. The very fact that the reader cannot precisely
recall says something about Powell's enonnous skill in creating his world and
characters. The novels, taken together, become a social fabric with no revealing
seams or patches. If Morris does nothing else in this study, he sets us all straight

again.
The fact is, however, he does a good deal more. Frequently eclipsed by the
later series, the earlier novels of the pre-war period are judiciously re-evaluated.
Morris calls attention to Powell's devastating and ironic eye as he probes the
imbroglio of the twenties and thirties. Comparing him favorably with Waugh
and Huxley as a social satirist, Morris does not seem to sufficiently emphasize the
great difference in tone and attitude of Powell when compared with his CODtemporaries. The vitriolic cynicism of Huxley's calvinistic vision is not really
to be found in any of Powell's early work: even Agents and Patients (1936)
and Afternoon Men (1931) which are, perhaps, the most astringent of all. A
different tone, to the contrary, prevails. The irony of life itself and the peculiar,
erratic sense of humor which must be a singular attribute of the Creator,
produces a compassionate note in Powell like that of a Jane Austen writing
in a more mordant time and place.
One is reminded of a scene in Afternoon Men in which Fotheringham, totally
drunk and almost totally unappealing as a personality, launches a paean in praise
of friendship before the benumbed and captive, Atwater. Unable to "connect"
(as Forster calls it in Howards End) with those about him, except in the most
superficial and enervating way, he proclaims that "when love has come to
mean the most boring form of lust, when power means the most useless pots of
money, when fame means the vulgarist son of publicity," etc., etc., and then,
concludes that

>II

'it is then, and only then, that we shall realise fully, that we shall realise
in its entirety, that we shall in shan come to know with any degree of
accuracy -What was I saying? I seem to have lost the thread.'
'Friendship'
'That was it, of course. Pm sorry. That we shall realise what friendship means to each one of us and all of us, and how it was that, and
that only, that made it all worth while.'
, Made what worth while? t
Morris, using the excerpt, deletes that awful pause and the subsequent
rejoinder of his listener which so clearly enunciates, despite the general hilarity of
the scene, the underlying and pervasive pathos. Behind the public school glibness of his torturous delivery, lies a sensitivity and an almost frantic yeaming
for something which will give meaning to life. That is of the best of Powell's
artistry.
From the early books, Morris does note the emergence of a melodic line of
themes and dramatic tensions which come to an orchestrated perfection under
the mature hand of Powell in the later sequence. One such theme, he m.aintains,
is the perpetual struggle between men whose dominant prehension of the order
of things is sensual and imaginative in opposition to those who are dominated
by a concentrated will and, sometimes, obsessively ·dominating ideas. This chronic
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dualism of human society found throughout history, Morris feels, is particularly
agonizing in the twentieth century. The man of imagination or the sensualist
finds little room, one suspects, in a period energized by "isms," and spawning
material splendors and squalors with indifferent fury.
Still another theme is that of power: its leverage, its use, and its justifications.
Tentatively explored in Agents and Patients particularly (Are there agents and
patients' etherized upon a table '?-just as there are murderers and murderees,
as Huxley would say?), the later novels expand this exploration as Nick Jenkins
tries to define power and find a proper balance in a decaying social order.
In the chapter which links his analysis of the earlier works with those of A
Dance to the Music of Time, Morris considers in some detail the use of the
central image of the sequence. Developed through contrast, he pointedly
illustrates that Powell's use of the time image differs significantly from the time
fragmentation produced by the stream-of-consciousness technique of Joyce and
Faulkner; nor is it similar to Proust's "Bergsonian mysticism" which supports
an implicit a priori that claims "past actions are sustained in the present and
the present is interpretable only in terms of the past." Character is seen, as
Morris interprets Proust, as being permanently fixated on the past with little
hope of escape even under the excruciating pressures of experience.
Powell's use of time is classical, he asserts, which "enables him to focus on
the essential aim of the novels sequence: to play changing sensibilities against
the continuum of human history." The plot, one might add, has a beginning,
a middle, and an end; although the characters, acting out their own hesitant
choreography may be quite unaware of the ultimate pattern of their lives, either
as goal or achievement. But what of the larger and grander dance of humanity
which we call history? Powell seems to be making an oblique move toward a
consideration of that theme in The Kindly Ones.
Although it is dangerous to speculate on the uncompleted series, as Morris
recognizes, he does think that no eschaton will neatly embrace the completed
work: rather the finale will be more in the nature of a coda in which the notes,
having come to a momentary rest, will reverberate with overtones anticipating
other harmonies, other dissonances. There is really no end to the music of time.
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